America's mid-term elections provide the latest example of an expanding phenomenon: democratic governments that face no effective challenge by an opposition. More precisely, a growing number of democratically elected political leaders aren't forced to confront alternative leaders representing the disaffected.
The phenomenon is by no means confined to what once was the political right. Britain is currently experiencing what can almost be called the self-destruction of the opposition Conservative Party. For the third time in seven years, the Tories are devouring their own leader, without any viable alternative leader in sight.
In Germany, Gerhard Schrder's narrow victory is made secure by the intense soul-searching now underway among the defeated Christian Democrat opposition.
Even more starkly unbalanced political landscapes can be found in France and Italy, where neither President Jacques Chirac nor Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi need fear their challengers; indeed, neither has a challenger to speak of.
In Russia, President Vladimir Putin bestrides his country's elected Duma like Gulliver over the Lilliputians.
How and why has this happened? How, in particular, can this situation be explained in view of the fact that today's unchallenged heads of government are (at least for the most part) not towering leaders whose charisma shields them from opposition? One reason is the ongoing personalization of politics.
Whether someone is charismatic or not, voters want a figurehead, and preferably one with ''celebrity'' value. This celebrity may be based on personality, as with British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Berlusconi, or on circumstance, as with President George Bush, Schrder and Putin, but it is part and parcel of the new politics of media appeal.
Behind this, however, lies a deeper change to democracy. The end of ideology has been invoked so often that one hesitates to repeat the phrase. Still, it is a fact that, in all cases of governments without effective opposition, it is not easy to formulate an electorally viable alternative policy to challenge the leaders.
Putin is perhaps the most extreme in this regard, but Blair and Berlusconi are not far behind in possessing this ''policy immunity.'' They could form coalitions with anyone, whatever their traditional political affiliations may be.
However, this condition may not last. In at least two respects, alternative policy options are beginning to emerge, and these may one day dominate public debate.
In Europe, there is an obvious difference between advocates of a ''European model'' of social and moral capitalism and others who adhere to the neo-liberal ''Washington consensus'' that Europeans associate with America's economic model.
Internationally, the clash between unilateralists and multilateralists is not confined to the United States. Some see it, in present circumstances, as a clash between peace by negotiation and active, even preemptive intervention.
Then there are the great unspoken issues. Law and order is on the agenda of most governments, but many voters feel that it still does not have proper prominence.
Immigration is regarded as a deep threat by many people, so that demagogues are increasingly able to marshal resentment and grass-roots support.
Thus, despite today's political quiet, major divisions between apparently unchallenged leaders and shifting popular moods may be gaining strength below the surface.
This disquiet is expressed in several ways. One is through voter apathy. Most of the leaders mentioned earlier command a strong loyalty from only a small minority of their total electorates, so their legitimacy is dubious.
Another takes the form of ''opposition by media.'' This has become an issue in a number of countries, and it has led some governments (as Putin's did recently) to curb freedom of expression.
Then there is the tell-tale emergence and disappearance of protest parties like the Dutch groups gathered by the slain Pim Fortuyn. The tale they tell is one of the failure of democratic institutions as they now stand. This tale is further underlined by the growing role of the street, of demonstrations of public irritation focusing on particular issues but really directed against unchallenged governments.
The result is a worrying combination of creeping authoritarianism among those who rule and the growing unrest of the ruled.
As is often the case, there is no medicine against this syndrome. However, the need for an effective institutional opposition is evident. Governments without opposition pose a threat to democracy itself. To defend our liberty, we need domestic democracy as much as a readiness to attack whatever forces of evil may exist elsewhere in the world.
Ralf Dahrendorf is a member of the British House of Lords and a former director of the London School of Economics.
